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SUMMARIES 
This article compares treatments of the infinite, 
of continuity and definitions of real numbers produced 
by the German mathematician Georg Cantor and Richard 
Dedekind in the late 19th century with similar inter- 
ests developed at virtually the same time by the 
American mathematician/philosopher C. S. Peirce. 
Peirce was led, not by the internal concerns of math- 
ematics which had motivated Cantor and Dedekind, but 
by research he undertook in logic, to investigate 
orders of infinite sets (multitudes, in his termin- 
OlWY) I and to introduce the related concept of infin- 
itesimals. His arguments in support of the mathematical 
and logical validity of infinitesimals (which were re- 
jected by such eminent mathematicians as Cantor, Peano, 
and Russell at the turn of the century) are considered. 
Attention is also given to the connections between 
Peirce's mathematics, his philosophy, and especially 
his interest in continuity as it was related to his 
Pragmatism. 
Cet article compare, d'une part, les faqons 
d'aborder l'infinie et la continuite ainsi que les 
d6finitions des nombres r-gels &labor&es par les 
mathgmaticiens allemands Georg Cantor et Richard 
Dedekind vers la fin du XIXe sibcle, a, d'autre part, 
l'int&&t de m&me nature d&elopp& quasiment B la meme 
&poque par le mathgmaticien-philosophe americain C. S. 
Peirce. Peirce fut amen6 h 6tudier les ordres 
d'ensembles infinis (multitudes dans sa terminologie) 
et h introduire le concept d'infinitgsimal non pas, 
comme dans le cas de Cantor et Dedekind, par des pre- 
occupations purement mathematiques, mais plutot a la 
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suite des ses recherches en logique. Nous nous 
penchons sur son argumentation visant a montrer le 
bien-fond6 math&matique et logique des infinitesimaux 
(que rejetaient au tournant du siecle d'aussi gminents 
mathgmaticiens que Cantor, Peano et Russell). De plus 
nous nous attardons aux relations entre les math6matiques 
de Peirce et sa philosophie, plus particuliarement a 
son inter&t pour la notion de continuitg, dans la 
perspective de son pragmatisme. 
In diesem Beitrag werden die Behandlung des Unend- 
lichen, der Stetigkeit und die Definition reeller 
Zahlen der deutschen Mathematiker Georg Cantor und 
Richard Dedekind im ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert 
verglichen mit tihnlichen Bestrebungen, die der 
amerikanische Mathematiker-Philosoph C. S. Peirce zu 
genau der gleichen Zeit verfolgte. Wahrend Cantor und 
Dedekind zu ihren Untersuchungen durch innermathematische 
Probleme gefiihrt wurden, gaben ffir Peirce Forschungen 
auf dem Gebiet der Logik den AnlaB, Vielheiten von 
unendlichen Mengen zu untersuchen und den damit 
zusammenhangenden Begriff infinitesimaler GrbBen ein- 
zufiihren. Es werden die Argumente betrachtet, die er 
zugunsten der Verwendung des Begriffs infinitesimaler 
GriJ$en in mathematischer und logischer Hinsicht 
vorbrachte (und die urn die Jahrhundertwende von so 
hekannten Mathematikern wie Cantor, Peano und Russell 
zuriickgewiesen wurden). Ferner wird auf die Zusammen- 
hsnge hingewiesen, die zwischen der Mathematik. der 
Philosophie und dem besonderen Interesse von Peirce an 
der Stetigkeit (in verbindung mit seinem Pragmatismus) 
bestehen. 
For the past thirty years Carolyn Eisele has been respon- 
sible, almost single-handedly, for bringing the many-faceted 
mathematical talents of Charles S. Peirce to light. She has 
accomplished this, in part through her edition of Peirce's 
New Elements of Mathematics [Peirce 19761, as well as through 
her writings and lectures on Peirce, the first of which was 
published in Scripta Mathematics in 1951. In recognition of 
her preeminence as a Peirce scholar, she has been awarded an 
honorary doctorate from Texas Tech University, where she is 
also a member of the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, 
and has even been commissioned as an honorary member of the 
crew of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
surveying ship Peirce. 
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The recent publication of Professor Eisele's collected 
papers is one more indication of the influence of her work. 
The book, Studies in the Scientific and Mathematical Philosophy 
of Charles S. Peirce [Eisele 19791, includes thirty of her most 
important essays and papers, and is a necessary and valuable 
companion to The New Elements of Mathematics. Moreover, these 
papers are a testimony not just to the work of Peirce, but to 
Carolyn Eisele herself. As her Studies volume makes clear, 
there has been growing interest among scholars over the last 
few decades in Peirce as a mathematician. This in large measure 
is due to her sustained and persistent efforts. 
It is particularly fitting that the Hunter College colloquium 
honoring her works should have taken place in New York City, for 
Professor Eisele's initial contact with Peirce, which was en- 
tirely fortuitous, happened as she was reading manuscripts from 
the Plimpton Collection at Columbia University. In her first 
paper on Peirce, "The Liber Abaci," she describes what happened: 
"AS I continued to handle the volume [MS 1891 a-sheaf of notes 
on faded blue-grey paper fell out from under the back cover" 
[Eisele 1951, 151. When she eventually realized that the pages 
were not student notes, but a letter by Peirce to Plimpton, she 
knew that she had made an important discovery. In the letter, 
Peirce revealed himslef to be not only a well-informed anti- 
quarian, but a perspicacious historian of mathematics as well. 
A grant from the American Philosophical Society soon made 
it possible for Professor Eisele to begin archival research 
using collections of Peirce papers in Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
New York; and Washington, D.C. It was her hope, as she put it 
rather modestly in retrospect, (Ito collect materials pertinent 
to a critical and comprehensive study of the activities of 
Charles S. Peirce as a historian of science" [Eisele 1954, 351. 
It soon became apparent, however, that in order to do 
justice to Peirce's work in the history of science, a much 
deeper and more wide-ranging study of his work in philosophy, 
science, and mathematics would be necessary. Over the years, 
the results of this work began to accumulate. Articles soon 
appeared on a wide variety of subjects ranging from Peirce's 
work in probability and logic to map projections, binary arith- 
metic, economics, semiotics, scientific method, and the four- 
color problem. Several articles included analysis of Peirce's 
work in the history of science, especially his interest in such 
figures as Duns Scotus, Galileo, Kepler, and Darwin. Studies 
of Peirce at the Smithsonian Institution, his correspondence 
with Simon Newcomb, his importance as a "nineteenth-century man 
of science," and his significance as a philosophical critic of 
figures like Poincare' and Mach all found their way into lec- 
tures, or into print. 
As her research delved further and further into the writings 
and mind of Charles Peirce, Professor Eisele began to realize 
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that the key to understanding the connections between his diverse 
undertakings was his mathematics. Among the earliest papers to 
hint at this was "Binary Arithmetic," in which Professor Eisele 
showed that "Peirce was cognizant of the mathematical basis of 
all his thought" [Eisele 1966, 2011. Above all, his work in 
geometry, his analysis of continuity, infinitesimals, and the 
infinite, as well as his development of the logic of relatives, 
were especially significant. 
By 1971, at the Fourth International Congress for Logic, 
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Bucharest), Professor 
Eisele was ready to make a prominent issue of the fact that 
mathematics was indispensable for any proper understanding of 
Peirce's thought: "the philosophy of his later years was grounded 
in mathematical foundations that he had investigated and had 
personally helped to establish, mostly for logical purposes" 
[Eisele 1971, 2381. By 1975, the need to make scholars aware 
of the significance of Peirce's mathematics had become an ener- 
getic crusade: "any study of Peirce's thoroughly integrated 
thought must start with an acquaintance with his productivity 
in pure and applied mathematics" [Eisele 1975, 2451. Professor 
Eisele's recent achievement, in fact, making good her claims 
for the pervasive influence of mathematics in every aspect of 
Peirce's work, is her edition of the New Elements of Mathema- 
tics. 
Carolyn Eisele has labored unstintingly to bring the message 
of Peirce's mathematics not just to a wider forum of historians 
of science, but to philosophers and intellectual historians as 
well. As she once put it, quite unabashedly in her opening re- 
marks at the Vth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, 
and Philosophy of Science: "I have come to London [Ontario, 
Canada] on the usual mission of propagandizing for an appreci- 
ation and celebration of the endlessly fruitful thought of 
Charles S. Peirce" [Eisele 1975, 2451. In what follows, I shall 
take my turn in propagandizing for Peirce, and in particular, 
shall consider an especially important aspect of his work as it 
relates to the history of mathematics at the turn of the last 
century. 
* * * * * * * * 
In 1881 Charles S. Peirce published a paper, "On the Logic 
of Number," in the American Journal of Mathematics. Later, he 
was always proud to emphasize that he had characterized the 
difference between finite and infinite sets well before Dedekind 
had done so in 1888. Peirce asserted that Dedekind's Was sind 
und was sollen die Zahlen ? was doubtless influenced by his own 
paper, because Peirce had sent Dedekind a copy of his article 
of 1881 [l]. But the most interesting feature of Peirce's 
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entire approach to mathematics was not the way in which it re- 
sembled the research then being conducted in Europe, but in the 
ways it differed from the approaches taken by Richard Dedekind 
or his equally famous colleague, Georg Cantor, to the problems 
of continuity and infinity. 
Cantor, for example, had been motivated to study the con- 
tinuum of real numbers as a result of his early study of the 
representation theorem for trigonometric series [Dauben 1979, 
37-401. Dedekind's characterization of the continuum and his 
introduction of the "Dedekind cut" to define the real numbers 
were inspired by his desire to provide rigorous foundations in 
teaching calculus [Dedekind 1872, l-31. Specifically, in trying 
to teach the basic elements of the differential calculus, par- 
ticularly theorems involving limits, Dedekind realized that 
geometric intuition, though a guide, was not rigorously satis- 
factory. And so he produced a purely arithmetic study of con- 
tinuity and the irrational numbers. 
Peirce, on the contrary, took an entirely different approach. 
Unlike Cantor and Dedekind, whose interests in foundations, 
irrational numbers, and continuity proceeded from problems 
arising within the subject--Cantor from his investigation of 
trigonometric series, and Dedekind from his teaching--Peirce 
was inspired by his studies in logic. In this difference lies 
the key to understanding why Peirce differed so markedly from 
Cantor and Dedekind in his approach to the problems of conti- 
nuity and the infinite. 
Peirce's first publication describing the difference between 
finite and infinite classes appeared in 1881, while he was lec- 
turing on logic at Johns Hopkins. His paper began with a def- 
inition (though insufficient) of continuity: 
A continuous system is one in which every quantity 
greater than another is also greater than some inter- 
mediate quantity greater than that other. [Peirce 1881, 
159; 1931, 3.2561 
But since the rationals would be continuous under this def- 
inition, Peirce's description is inadequate, although it does 
represent a necessary condition. Peirce, however, was only 
beginning his study of continuity at the time; the most inter- 
esting feature of his paper appeared toward the end, where he 
offered a distinction between finite and infinite collections. 
He announced that a set was finite if no one-to-one correspon- 
dence could be found between the set and any proper subset. 
Peirce's favorite example was a syllogism which appeared in 
numerous equivalent forms throughout his mathematical and 
logical writings: 
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Every Texan kills a Texan 
No Texan is killed by more than one Texan 
Hence every Texan is killed by a Texan c21 
The syllogism is true only if the set of Texans is finite. 
The form of the syllogism, Peirce noted, was due to De Morgan, 
who called it the syllogism of transposed quantity [De Morgan 
18601. Thus Peirce's interest in the difference between finite 
and infinite classes did not stem directly from within mathe- 
matics as it had for Cantor and Dedekind. Instead, Peirce's 
interest in the infinite was inspired by his studies in logic, 
and the consequences one might draw from the syllogism of trans- 
posed quantity. 
In keeping with his interests, including metaphysical con- 
cerns related to the continuity of space and time, and in his 
desire to further his study of quantity, both finite and in- 
finite, as far as he could, Peirce decided that a logical def- 
inition of continuity was needed, and in 1897, when he published 
"The Logic of Relatives" in The Monist, he wrote that 
a perfectly satisfactory logical account of the concep- 
tion of continuity is required. This involves the def- 
inition of a certain kind of infinity, and in order to 
make that quite clear, it is requisite to begin by 
developing the logical doctrine of infinite multitude. 
This doctrine still remains, after the works of Cantor, 
Dedekind, and others, in an inchoate condition. For 
example, such a question remains unanswered as the 
following: is it, or is it not, logically possible 
for two collections to be so multitudinous that neither 
can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with a part 
or the whole of the other? To resolve this problem 
demands, not a mere applicaiton of logic, but a further 
development of the conception of logical possibility. 
[Peirce i897, 3.5261 
But what did Peirce mean by the need to define a certain 
kind of infinity before the concept of continuity could be ac- 
counted for logically? What was "inchoate" about the work of 
Cantor and Dedekind? Why was the comparability of cardinals, 
in Peirce's view, impossible to establish without developing 
further the concept of logical possibility? What, in fact, did 
Peirce mean by logical possibility? The answers to all these 
questions hinge on Peirce's view of the infinite, and upon a 
very important discovery, one he apparently made independently 
of Georg Cantor, and one for which Peirce was always, and justi- 
fiably so, very proud. 
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Peirce proved (though exactly when he did so for the first 
time is unclear) that the power of the set of all subsets of a 
given set is always greater than the power of the original set 
itself. In other words, for any exponent N, 2N > N, a result, 
as Peirce put it, of "prime importance" [3]. Beginning from 
the smallest infinite set, the set of all integers, he concluded 
that it was always possible to produce increasingly larger sets 
of greater and greater power. Peirce designated the collection 
of all integers "denumerable." The set of all real numbers 
comprised what he called the "first abnumeral" or the "primi- 
postnumeral" multitude. (Note that Peirce has tacitly assumed 
as true the validity of what has come to be known as Cantor's 
Continuum Hypothesis.) 
The set of all subsets of the real numbers produced the 
"second abnumeral," or the "secondo-postnumeral" multitude, and 
so on. Since one could always form from such sets the set of 
all subsets, Peirce noted that there could be no maximal mul- 
titude. But Peirce also commented that as for the second ab- 
numeral, mathematics could offer no example of such a multitude. 
This comment reveals that Peirce was apparently unfamiliar with 
a paper Cantor had published in 1891, in which he showed by his 
famous method of diagonalization that the set of all continuous 
functions on [O,l]--the unit interval--was indeed of a power, 
or cardinality, greater than the set of all real numbers [Dauben 
1979, 165-1681. Peirce, however, maintained that in fact mathe- 
matics had no occasion to consider multitudes as great as 
secondo-postnumeral multitudes--a comment that is all the more 
puzzling, as we shall see, in light of his construction of in- 
finitesimals and his assertion that continua were greater in 
power than any postnumeral multitude. 
In a letter to his friend E. H. Moore, Peirce commented upon 
the significance of his discovery that there was no maximum mul- 
titude: 
Here we have a hint about continuity.... The continuum 
is a General. It is a General of relation. Every 
General is a continuum vaguely defined. 141 
By a "General" Peirce seems to have meant that which was 
neither discrete nor definite, "General" as opposed to particular 
or to something completely specified. But what did Peirce see 
in all this to help solve the mystery of continuity? 
Peirce argued that if a continuum did not contain all the 
points that it possibly could, then there would be gaps or dis- 
continuities present [Peirce 1976, 3, 880-8811. Thus it was a 
problem of the utmost importance to determine what the maximum 
possible multitude was in order to determine the power of con- 
tinua. But Peirce had already shown that there could be no such 
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greatest possible multitude, that the process of forming power 
sets was unending, and that consequently it was a process that 
remained potential, indefinite. Similarly, if the continuum 
were to contain the maximum possible multitude of points, it 
had to be correspondingly potential, indefinite. 
Since Peirce regarded the essence of multitudes to be their 
definiteness, thus making it possible to determine their powers 
or cardinalities, it was reasonable for him to assert that since 
the collection of all abnumerals was unending, potentially in- 
finite, thus entirely indefinite, it could not properly be callet 
a set. Or, in Peirce's terminology, it could not be called a 
multitude. Likewise, the elements constituting a continuum 
could not be regarded as comprising a set or multitude of 
objects. Thus the complete determination of continua was im- 
possible, for Peirce regarded the concept as intrinsically 
potential, essentially general [Peirce 1976, 3, 62, 9811. 
Consequently, Peirce was led to reject Cantor's view that 
the geometric continuum was somehow made up of a multitude of 
points. Peirce realized that there were two features of such 
continua that had to be considered: one involved quantity, the 
other involved order. In 1895 Cantor had published his analysis 
to what he called the simply-ordered type 0 of the continuum of 
real.numbers [Cantor 18951. Peirce, however, disagreed on two 
counts. The collection of points comprising any continuum must 
be infinitely larger than any Cantor contemplated because, 
Peirce claimed, the real numbers R as defined by Cantor were 
grossly insufficient to account for the geometric continuum 
[Peirce 1976, 3, 1221. This was so, he argued, because of his 
discovery that the set of abnumerals was unending. Since the 
line must contain all points possible, and since the set R cor- 
responded to the multitude represented by 2Ko, it could not 
possibly, as a completed multitude, account for the nature of 
continuity. As for the question of the order of elements con- 
stituting a continuum, Peirce suggested that something like the 
proper idea was approximated if between every pair of rational 
numbers one inserted a sequence of irrational numbers. Between 
any two irrationals of this sequence one could pack yet another 
such sequence, and so on, without end. Thus Peirce asserted 
that it was always possible to pack sets of points of higher 
and higher multitude--or cardinality--between any two points of 
a continuum, however close. The continuum would eventually be 
"cemented together," and not by virtue of discrete points 
[Peirce 1976, 3, 981. 
To illustrate his idea of continuity, Peirce outlined a 
procedure which he called interpolation on the unit interval, 
and which involved decimal representations given with only the 
digits 0 and 1. At step (I), there was only one interpolation: 
at step (II) there were 2; at step (III) there were four; at 
step (IV) there were 8; and at step (N) there would be 2N-1. 
Schematically: 
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STEP (I) .lOO... 
(11) .OlO... .llO... 
(III) .OOl... .Oll... .lOl... .lll... 
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1.000 
Here Peiroe found, as he put it, a "premonition of continu- 
ity" [Peirce 1976, 3, 87-881. In carrying out this procedure, 
a nondenumerably infinite number of interpolations would be 
made. Somehow this process was to help Peirce explain how the 
continuum was able, in his words, to "stick together" [Peirce 
1976, 3, 881. NC finite collection could ever "stick together" 
in any order, nor could any denumerably infinite collection if 
considered in any well-ordered form. The difficulty in describ- 
ing the continuity of the real line, Peirce believed, reduced 
to the fact that numbers per se could never account for contin- 
uity [Peirce 1931, 3.568; 1976, 3, 93-941. Numbers expressed 
nothing but the order, he believed, of discrete objects. Nothing 
discrete could possibly be multitudinous enough to account for 
the continuum. 
For example, Peirce noted that in supposing the countable 
collection of the set of rational points to be completely pres- 
ent on the line, one was in effect supposing also the collection 
of irrational points in the sense that the irrationals could be 
considered as interpolated between the rationals. Hence the 
denumerable set of rationals implied the existence of a nonde- 
numerable collection Gf points, namely, the first abnumeral 
multitude of irrational numbers. In exactly the same way, said 
Peirce, the system of irrational points on a line led to a 
secundo-postnumeral collection of points interpolated between 
the irrationals. This secundo-postnumeral collection involved, 
for Peirce, his infinitesimals, and it is possible to under- 
stand the role they played more clearly by returning for a 
moment to his diagram of decimal interpolations. 
In a letter to M. F. C. S. Schiller of 1906, Peirce explained 
that by a Leibnizian infinitesimal of the first order he meant 
an assumed quantity smaller than any finite positive quantity 
[Peirce 1976, 3, 9891. It was the first quantity after the 
sequence -1, .Ol, -001, .OOOl, .OOOOl, . . . . Peirce believed 
it was impossible to prove that there was no such quantity. In 
fact, he believed his infinitesimals were given an imprimatur 
of sorts by nature, since he took their existence to be neces- 
sary for physics. This is clear from letters, among others, 
that he sent to C. J. Keyser in 1908, and to Josiah Royce in 
1902, [Peirce 1976, 3, 898 and 957, respectively]. 
Peirce's most important reason for insisting that his infin- 
itesimals were acceptable was their self-consistency. Logically, 
being nGncGntradictOry, there was no reason not tG admit them 
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into mathematics. Although Peirce did not undertake a careful 
arithmetic investigation of the properties of his infinitesimals, 
nor did he undertake any investigation of non-Archimedean sys- 
tems in general, he was a protoproponent of nonstandard analysis 
in believing that there was perhaps more to understanding the 
nature of continuity than the rationals and irrationals to- 
gether could manage to explain. 
To make Peirce's point as clear as possible, it may be help- 
ful, in closing, to sketch his reasons for arguing that the 
rationals and irrationals together were insufficient to account 
for the nature of continuity. While Cantor and Dedekind re- 
garded the irrational numbers as completing the rationals, and 
thus conferring completeness on the real numbers, Peirce saw 
the relation between rationals and irrationals somewhat differ- 
ently. He concluded that there was a kind of "nextness" in the 
reals which actually constituted a breach of continuity [Peirce 
1976, 3, 121-122, 1251. 
Suppose, he argued, that we do have a clear idea of a se- 
quence of real numbers. If we have a clear idea of their order, 
it can be assumed that any set of objects sufficiently multitu- 
dinous can be similarly ordered. Assume each of these objects 
to be replaced with a sequence of points, similar in order to 
the real numbers on the open interval (0, 1). But there is no 
reason to stop here, and Peirce went on to replace each point 
of such series by yet other series, and so on, without end. 
In his own words: 
The result is, that we have altogether eliminated 
points. We have a series of series of series, ad 
infinitum. Every part, however closely designated, is 
still a series and divisible into further series. 
There are no points in such a line. There is no exact 
boundary between any parts. [Peirce 1976, 3, 1261 
It would be easier to interpret the significance Peirce 
attached to his infinitesimals for mathematics had he ever 
commented explicitly upon Cantor's and Dedekind's axioms of 
continuity, which hypothesized the equivalence of the standard 
Archimedean arithmetic continuum and the geometric continuum. 
But all we have is Peirce's allegation that the real numbers 
were insufficient to account for the continuity of space and 
time. As for analysis, however, it never had need to consider 
multitudes greater in magnitude than that of the first abnumeral, 
which meant that the set of real numbers was enough for the 
interests of analysis and presumably for all of mathematics 
[Peirce 1976, 3, 851. 
Ultimately Peirce's infinitesimals remained vague rather 
than rigorously defined mathematical entities. He never sug- 
gested how they might be useful in analysis. But then Peirce's 
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interests had never been inclined toward analysis. From the 
very beginning he had been inspired by the purely logical impli- 
cations of the syllogism of transposed quantity, and the logic 
of relations. Thus, unlike Cantor, he was not concerned to 
develop the arithmetic properties of his ideas, since their 
existence as numbers was not for him of great consequence. He 
was interested in illuminating a deep philosophical problem of 
long standing, namely, that of the continuum, and he felt that 
conceptually he had found an approach to the subject that was 
the most satisfying of all. 
Finally, how can we now draw all of these ideas together in 
order to interpret Peirce's claim that "the continuum is a Gen- 
eral," meaning that it could not be defined as a set in Cantor's 
sense of a collection of distinct elements, and Peirce's state- 
ment that "infinity is nothing but a peculiar twist given to 
generality" [Peirce to William James, June 8, 1903, in Peirce 
1931, 8.268]? Peirce took generality to involve the potential 
infinite, in that .anything not general, i.e., specific, was 
completed in some sense or other. He also took infinity to be 
a potentiality, something never completed, and thus it too re- 
posed upon generality. Reasoning about such matters, he noted 
with perhaps too little emphasis, was always exceedingly puz- 
zling. Almost all metaphysicians, and even mathematicians, he 
added, had fallen into pitfalls concerning the infinite where 
the "ground was spongy" [Peirce 1976, 3, 791. Trouble inevit- 
ably stemmed from existential quantifiers like "all and every," 
but if one were always certain to determine how objects in 
question were to be selected, he believed that erroneous reason- 
ing could easily be avoided. The trouble with the collection 
of all abnumerable multitudes was simply that it could never 
be considered as completed. It was self-generating, without 
end. Such supermultitudinous collections were so great that 
they were no longer discrete, and not being complete, no defi- 
nite determination of their magnitude could be given. They were 
potential, and as such, general. In the same way the line was 
general, indeterminate, since between any of its points, Peirce 
imagined that more could be packed representing supermultitu- 
dinous collections. To quote Peirce directly: 
Such supermultitudinous collections stick together by 
logical necessity. Its constituent individuals are no 
longer distinct, or independent. They are not subjects 
but phases expressive of the properties of the continuum. 
[Peirce 1976, 3, 951 
Peirce offered a graphic illustration. Suppose a collection 
of blades were to cut the line. So long as they did not com- 
prise a supermultitudinous collection, the line would be cut up 
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into bits, each of which was still a line. Peirce therefore 
urged mathematicians to discard all analytical theories about 
lines, and recommended that they begin from his view, a synthe- 
tic point of view [Peirce 1976, 3, 961. By a simple mental 
experiment, he believed he had shown that the line refused to 
be cut up into points. But even if mathematicians refused to 
accept his arguments, Peirce insisted that only one thing mat- 
tered: his idea of continuity and of infinitesimals involved 
no contradiction. In closing, he warned: 
I am careful not to call supermultitudinous collections 
multitudes. Multitudes imply an independence of the 
individuals of one another which is not found in super- 
multitudinous sets. Here the elements are cemented 
together, they become indistinct. [Peirce 1976, 3, 
87-89 ] 
Here Peirce has reached the potentiality, the generality 
that he had earlier said was essential if one were to under- 
stand properly the structure of continuity. For Peirce, the 
essence of continuity depended upon cardinality (i.e., the 
supermultitudinousness of the elements of the line), and ordi- 
nality (or, as he put it, "cohesion"--"the intrinsic arrangement 
which is inseparable from the particular grade of multitude in 
which those phenomena of cohesion are found" [Peirce 1976, 3, 
98-991). 
It is now possible to see what Peirce meant when he wrote 
to Paul Carus, editor of The Monist, to say that at last he had 
seen where Cantor had gone wrong [in a letter of August 17, 
1899: Peirce 1976, 3, 7921. Continuity could not come from 
any collection of points because points were discrete, deter- 
mined, and if anything, points represented discontinuities when 
removed from the line. In summarizing his views for Judge 
Francis Russell in 1909, Peirce interpreted the essence of con- 
tinuity in terms of the potential and completely general nature 
of the ideas involved. "AS to a straight line not having any 
definition proper, it is demonstrable that it cannot be, properly 
speaking, defined" [Peirce 1976, 3, 9811. 
If we may take "properly speaking" to mean "mathematically 
speaking," then there was not much Peirce could hope to offer 
in such a view to his mathematical colleagues. But it is also 
true that he did not feel mathematics needed to go so far in 
the analysis of the continuum as he had gone. Peirce was inter- 
ested in pushing the logical consequences of his ideas to their 
ultimate conclusions for the sake of philosophy, but mathematics, 
he seemed to say, could stop at something less. 
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For Peirce, such ideas justified themselves as a matter of 
instinct, of common sense [Peirce 1976, 3, 561. He had always 
held that his intuitive understanding of the continuum, or the 
continuity of space and time, was the ultimate guide in his 
analysis of continuity. Nothing could have been further from 
the aims of Weierstrassian analysis, which sought to reject all 
such intuitions and aimed to base mathematics upon more certain 
foundations of arithmetic. Weierstrass had the example of every- 
where continuous, nowhere differentiable functions to show the 
inadequacy of intuition. But Peirce was not convinced, and once 
even commented that Weierstrassian mathematics, in showing a 
distrust of intuition, betrayed an ignorance of fundamental 
principles of logic [Peirce 1976, 3, 9681. Peirce followed his 
intuitions as far as they would carry him, and it may have been 
this feature of his thinking, as much as his interest in philo- 
sophical and metaphysical arguments, that prevented his being 
more readily accepted by his contemporaries. 
Peirce once said that it was the business of science and 
mathematics to guess. For mathematics this reduced to the 
fabrication of hypotheses to be tested for logical self-consis- 
tency [Peirce 1976, 3, 8931. If no contradictions could be 
deduced, then the hypothesis, or the mathematical theory in 
question, stood as acceptable. This was the basis upon which 
Peirce argued most persuasively for the respectability of his 
ideas concerning infinitesimals and continuity. Kepler, to 
Peirce's mind, was the greatest guesser that science had ever 
seen. But in terms of American mathematics at the turn of the 
century, Peirce may easily have been an equally impressive 
guesser, producing a mathematical hypothesis of infinitesimals. 
Kepler lacked sufficient mathematical techniques and a 
theory of gravitation to establish a convincing explanation of 
his laws, deficiencies Isaac Newton would later remedy. In 
much the same way, Peirce lacked sufficient techniques to pro'- 
duce a rigorous theory of non-Archimedean systems. But his 
hypotheses were eventually vindicated, in the 20th century, by 
mathematicians like Schmieden, Laugwitz, Robinson, and 
Luxemburg [5]. Perhaps until the middle of this century, only 
a mathematician as interested in philosophy as was Peirce, and 
as isolated from the prevailing assumptions of established math- 
ematics of the 19th century, could have pursued the problem of 
continuity in the way he did. Out of touch with most European 
mathematicians, Peirce considered infinitesimals with an unpre- 
judiced eye, not only to affirm their existence, but to argue 
as well that the arithmetic continuum of real numbers was only 
a very incomplete picture of the actual richness of any con- 
tinuum. Working in obscurity, often in penury and isolation, 
it was nevertheless this American mathematician who saw, if 
only a glimmer, what later generations might be more willing 
to accept. In light of current research in nonstandard analysis, 
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it is now possible to consider, more rigorously than did Peirce, 
alternatives to the traditional 19th-century view of the stan- 
dard Archimedean continuum. 
NOTES 
1. Peirce explained this in a letter to P. E. B. Jourdain, 
December 5, 1908, in Peirce [1976, 3, 8831, and in the article 
"Multitude," in appendixes to Volume 3 [Peirce 1976, 3, 11171. 
Refer as well to a letter Peirce sent to the Editor of Science 
on March 16, 1900, "Infinitesimals," in Peirce [1931, 3.5641. 
2. Peirce gave the Texan version of the syllogism in a 
paper of 1881, in Peirce [1931, 3.2881. In a letter to Georg 
Cantor of December 23, 1900, he used Hottentots: Peirce [1976, 
3, 7721. 
3. [Peirce 1976, 3, 51.1 See as well Peirce's letters to 
George Cantor (December 23, 1900), and to F. W. Frankland (May 
8, 1906), in Peirce [1976, 3, 777 and 785, respectively]. 
Peirce also discusses transfinite exponentiation and power sets 
in what appears to have been a draft for a lecture on "Multitude 
and Number," probably from 1897. Turn in particular to the 
section on "The Primipostnumeral," in Peirce [1931, 4.200-4.212-J. 
4. Peirce in a letter to E. H. Moore, March 20, 1902, in 
Peirce [1976, 3, 9251. For a discussion of "Generals," consult 
"Notes on Symbolic Logic and Mathematics," in Peirce 11931, 
3.6421. 
5. Schmieden and Laugwitz 1958; Luxemburg 1962; Robinson 
1966; Luxemburg and Robinson 1972. 
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